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Abstract
We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market con-
sisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest
below a certain quality threshold, they only compete for those consumers already
aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the high-
est quality attracts all consumers. In equilibrium, firms do not choose their invest-
ment deterministically but randomize over two disconnected intervals. On the one
hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive
element: holding fixed the behavior of the rival firm, a firm with a larger cap-
tive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand,
the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high
quality introduces a pro-competitive element: high quality investments becomes
more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm
increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic
effect on the investment levels of both firms.
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1 Introduction
Consumers typically differ in the set of firms that they consider before making a pur-
chasing decision and firms are not able to easily change a consumer’s consideration
set. When a product is of particularly high quality however, most consumers become
aware of its existence, be it through word-of-mouth recommendation, social networks
or news reports. In this case, the firm offering this product is in the consideration set of
all consumers. In this paper, we study how the co-existence of initially captive market
segments and of the possibility of reaching all consumers by providing exceptionally
high quality affects competition.
We model this problem as a duopoly in which firms simultaneously choose to in-
vest in the quality of their product. A share of the consumers observe both firms,
while the others are “captive” in the sense that they initially observe only a single firm.
Captive consumers may however cease to be so if a product outside of their initial
consideration set is of very high quality. A standard argument is that the existence of
captive market segments is anti-competitive because it decreases the incentives for a
dominant firm to compete for the rest of the market. In our model, the presence of cap-
tive consumers also introduces a pro-competitive element: As the only way to become
visible to the captive base of the competitor is to offer a very good product, a higher
share of the consumers initially considering only one firm only may actually induce
firms to offer products of higher quality.
The impact of a dominant firm trying to make consumers unaware of alternatives
to its products is at the heart of several major competition cases. Those cases illustrate
the regulator’s desire to ensure consumers awareness of competing alternatives when
one firm already acquired a dominant market position. In 2013, Microsoft was fined
by the European Commission for failing to make Windows users aware of compet-
ing web browsers despite being committed to do so since a 2009 settlement.1 Perhaps
ironically, this ruling is almost contemporary to Google Chrome overtaking Microsoft
Internet Explorer as the market leader, despite Windows still enjoying more than 80%
market share at the time, and before mobile phones became a major source of Internet
browsing.2 In June 2017, Google was fined for hiding alternatives to its own compari-
son shopping service. At the source of the complaint was a website called “Foundem”
arguing that Google showed its users the comparison website “Froogle” (now Google
1“Commission fines Microsoft for non-compliance with browser choice commitments,” European
Commission Press Release, 6 March 2013, IP/13/196.
2According to data by traffic analysis website StatCounter, Chrome became market leader in Jan-
uary 2012, when mobile browsing still represented only 8.49% of the traffic. In January 2012, Microsoft
Windows had a 82.06% share of the market for Operating Systems (statcounter.com).
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shopping) only, hiding the competitors.3 In 2018, Google was fined again for restrict-
ing Android device manufacturers in what they showed to consumers, in particular
forcing them to pre-install Google search and Google’s Chrome browser.4
Our model confirms the regulator’s intuition that a dominant firm hiding the exis-
tence of its competitor products to its captive consumer base may be anti-competitive.
We however show that the impact of a larger segment of the market observing the
dominant firm’s product only may be to increase the incentives for both firms to invest
in the quality of their products. This can happen when the firm with the fewest captive
consumers invests to capture the entire market with strictly positive probability. Thus,
competition policy should be different depending on whether there exist an underdog
with such capacities - such as in the Internet Explorer case -, or if the “captive” segment
of the dominant firm really is impossible to reach - such as in the “Foundem” case.
The question of the economic impact of consumers observing different sets of firms
has received much attention in economics. Early models of price dispersion (Varian,
1980; Burdett and Judd, 1983) study consumers that are heterogeneous in the number
of firms they observe. Among the newer models using the dichotomy between in-
formed and informed buyers, the one by de Corniere and Taylor (2019) is of particular
interest to us, as the authors characterize the competitive impact of a dominant search
engine guiding consumers towards a specific product. A general characterization of
price competition in oligopoly settings with different consideration sets is provided by
Armstrong and Vickers (2018). The novelty of our approach is that we allow a firm to
directly enter the consideration set of all consumers by providing a sufficiently high
quality product.
By construction, our setting is similar to an all pay auction (Baye et al., 1996) but
in contrast to the standard model, prizes are endogenous. The unique equilibrium is
in mixed strategies. The intuition is similar to that of the standard all-pay auction: for
every given level of investment of the winning firm, the competitor could win instead
by choosing a marginally higher level. A crucial difference is that investments below
the threshold can only win a share of the “prize”, not-including the captive segment of
the competitor. When the threshold is very high, no firm ever tries to take the captive
segment of the other: the two firms randomize over the same interval of investments
in equilibrium, and make an expected profit equal to the value of their captive seg-
ment. When the threshold is exactly zero, both firms always compete at high intensity,
randomize over the same interval of investments in equilibrium, and make zero profit
3“Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal
advantage to own comparison shopping service” European Commission Press release, IP/17/1784, 27
June, 2017.
4“Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices to
strengthen dominance of Google’s search engine” European Commission Press release, IP/18/4581, 18
July, 2018.
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in expectation. Whenever the threshold is not too high but strictly positive, equilib-
rium bidding strategies are asymmetric. Firms choose investments below and above
the threshold and therefore expect to sometimes keep their captive consumers even
if they invest less than the competitor. Hence, even by not investing anything, each
firm makes a strictly positive expected profit. The higher is the threshold, the higher
is the probability mass that the firms put on investments below the threshold, and the
probability of one firm obtaining a monopoly position decreases. The support of the
equilibrium mixed strategy exhibits a gap just below the minimum investment neces-
sary to attract the captive consumers of the competitor. This is because choosing an
investment just above this threshold does not only increase the probability of winning,
but also the prize of winning, which is then the whole population instead of just a
share of it.
In our model, the level of investments endogenously determines the prizes for
which the firms compete. If investment is above a certain threshold, there is only one
prize to be won, but there are two prizes for smaller investments. We do not consider
the optimal design of the prize structure. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the opti-
mal allocation of prizes in a setting of imperfect information where the highest bidder
gets the first prize, and the second bidder the second prize. Siegel (2009) studies asym-
metric players competing for a fixed number of prizes. Another approach to multiple
prize all-pay auction is the Colonel Blotto game (Roberson, 2006), where consumers
bid separately for different prizes.
The endogeneity of the prizes in our setup comes from the well-known fact that
consumers sometimes are biased in favour of certain options. Consumers may expe-
rience switching costs (Klemperer, 1987), or they may inspect competing firms in a
certain order while bearing a search cost to observe an additional option (Arbatskaya,
2007, Armstrong et al., 2009). In the presence of switching costs, it is well known
that if firms cannot commit to prices they will offer “bargains-then-ripoffs” (Farrell
and Klemperer, 2007): assuming homogeneous consumers, firms compete fiercely for
market share in the first period (offering bargains) but extract all surplus from their
attached users in the second period (ripoffs). In an overlapping generations model
where undecided consumers arrive in each period, Farrell and Shapiro (1988) find that
the firms alternate in selling to unattached users because they can exploit them once
they are attached. In these models, consumers are ex ante identical and firms cannot
price-discriminate based on consumer behavior. If firms can use behavior-based price
discrimination, firms can poach their competitors’ consumers by offering them lower
prices without loosing on their own attached users (Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Fol-
lowing this approach, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004) show that firms have an incentive
to induce maximal switching costs because profits from poaching are increasing in the
level of switching costs. In our model, a firm that has a larger segment of captive (at-
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tached) consumers will offer on average lower quality, and this mirrors the finding that
it will offer a higher (ripoff) price because it relies on its captive segment.
We proceed as follows: we introduce the model and derive important properties of
the equilibrium strategies in the simultaneous investment game in Section 2. We then
derive the equilibrium in Section 3. We discuss the impact of the different parameters
on equilibrium behavior in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. For those results that
do not follow directly from the text, formal proofs are collected in Appendix A.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
There are two firms, 1 and 2, that compete by investing in the quality of an otherwise
homogenous product. Investment in quality is a fixed cost and the marginal produc-
tion cost is set to zero. There is a mass one of consumers willing to buy exactly one
unit of the product from the firm offering the highest quality in their consideration
set. Before the game starts, some consumers have a single firm in their consideration
set, while others have both. By investing above a certain quality threshold, a firm can
become prominent and enter the consideration set of all consumers.
Firm i ∈ {1, 2} incurs a cost of c(ki) for each unit it invests into the quality of its
product, with c continuous, c′ ≥ 0 and c′′ ≥ 0. In order to obtain closed form solutions,
we use the linear function c(ki) = cki when solving for bidding strategies in Section
3. A firm having invested a total of ki at cost c(ki) therefore offers a product of quality
ki ≥ 0. We interpret the cost of quality as the cost of generating a given revenue per
consumer, and we normalize this revenue to 1. This implies that we make two major
assumptions. First, the firm incurs a fixed cost to be able to offer a certain level of
quality to its users and this cost only depends on the quality level but it is independent
of the number of users. Second, the quality does not influence the per-user revenue.5
Building on the specification of Armstrong and Vickers (2018) we assume that a
fraction αi ∈ (0, 1) of consumers initially only has firm i ∈ {1, 2} in their consideration
set. The remaining consumers α12, which we also refer to as the contested segment,
have both firms in their consideration set.
The novelty of our model is that a firm becomes visible to all consumers if it chooses
an investment in quality above a certain threshold k¯. If firm i chooses an investment
ki < k¯, it is not considered by captive consumers of firm j 6= i. But if firm i chooses
an investment ki ≥ k¯, firm i is considered not only by its own captive consumers and
5While our modeling of costly investment in consumer revenue is close to de Corniere and Taylor
(2019), it differs in the sense that we take per-user revenue as given. Thus, there is no impact of per-user
revenue on consumer payoff.
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Table 1: Firm payoffs for different investment choices.
level of investment
ki, kj < k¯ ki ≥ k¯ or kj ≥ k¯
ki > kj (li(ki), oj(kj)) (wi(ki), 0)
kj > ki (oi(ki), lj(kj)) (0, wj(kj))
the contested segment but also by the captive consumers of firm j. We are interested
in the set of Nash equilibria of this game. The structure of the game and frequencies
of types are common knowledge. In reality, it is unlikely that a quality threshold such
as k¯ determines with certainty which firm enters each consideration set. This simple
modification of an otherwise standard setting allows us to represent the idea that in-
vestment can be either incremental or radical, and that only a radical investment can
make a firm visible to a consumer who is not yet aware of this firm’s product.6
Firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously choose their investment levels. Firm i receives a
payoff of
oi(ki) = αiProb(kj < k¯)− c(ki)
if it invests below the threshold (ki < k¯) and less than its competitor (ki < kj). We
refer to the particular case where a firm does not invest oi(0) as firm i’s outside option.
The outside option of firm i depends on the probability with which firm j chooses an
investment below k¯, in which case captive consumers do not consider firm j’s invest-
ment. Denote by
li(ki) = 1− αj − c(ki)
the payoff of firm i if it invests below the threshold (ki < k¯) and more than its competi-
tor (ki > kj). If firm i invests above the threshold ki ≥ k¯, captive consumers consider
both firms and the outside option of firm j drops to zero. In this case, firm i competes
for all segments of the market and earns at best a payoff
wi(ki) = 1− c(ki).
We assume that each relevant consumer segment is shared equally by both firms in
case of a tie. If at least one of the two firms invests k¯ or more, the market becomes a
monopoly because the highest quality firm then enters the consideration set of all con-
sumers. Thus, for investments above k¯, the market becomes a winner-take-all market.
We use this notation to summarize the corresponding payoffs for all combinations
of investments in table 1.
6To complement the analysis, we provide results from a simple probabilistic setting in Appendix B.
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2.2 Properties
We now derive some general properties of the equilibrium investments. The game
faced by the two firms resembles an all-pay auction where the bids are given by the
investment levels and prizes are given by the market shares. If the investment of a
firm exceeds the threshold k¯, the market share of the winning firm increases discontin-
uously as compared to a winning bid just below the threshold because at this point the
investment is just high enough to attract the competitor’s captive segment in addition
to the contested segment.
We first define the maximum possible level of investment at equilibrium as solving
c(kmax) = 1. It is never a best response for either firm to provide an investment greater
than kmax because the cost would then exceed the highest possible revenue. As can be
expected from the literature, the game does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium. The
intuition is that it is profitable to marginally outbid any deterministic investment of the
competitor because this only marginally increases costs but ensures winning the entire
market.
Lemma 1. The game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Furthermore, even if the mixed strategies may contain mass points in equilibrium,
these cannot be at the same investment levels for both firms. The intuition is that mass
points in one firm’s investment strategy imply that the expected profit of the other
firm from certain investment levels changes discretely at the respective investment
level and overbidding is profitable.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, at most one firm’s investment strategy has a mass point at any
given investment level.
We continue to show that apart from any mass points, the densities of both firms
equilibrium investment strategies coincide.
Lemma 3. There exists 0 < δ < k¯ and K¯ < kmax such that the densities of both firms’ equi-
librium investment strategies are continuous and identical on the intervals (0, δ) and (k¯, K¯).
This result develops from the standard idea that the support of the equilibrium
mixed strategy in an all-pay auction is connected and the density of equilibrium in-
vestments over this interval is constant and is identical across contestants. The dif-
ference with the existing literature comes from the possibility that the support of the
investment strategy consists of two disconnected intervals. This results is driven by
the discontinuity in the prize of winning at the threshold k¯. For investments below
k¯, a firm can be better off by choosing exactly k¯ and capturing the entire market than
by outbidding the competitor at the margin and winning only the contested segment.
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This tradeoff between marginally overbidding and bidding exactly k¯ induces an en-
dogenous gap between the highest “low intensity” investment δ and the lowest “high
intensity” investment k¯.
Finally, we show that the equilibrium investment strategies of both firms admit
mass points only at zero and at the threshold beyond which the consideration of cap-
tive consumers is reached.
Lemma 4. If a firm bids a level of investment k with strictly positive probability, then k ∈
{0, k¯}.
The intuition behind this property is the following. Each firm generally prefers
bidding marginally above k′ to bidding marginally below k′ if the competitor invests
k′ with strictly positive probability (see Lemma 1 and 2). Therefore, any investment k′
that is chosen with a strictly positive probability in equilibrium must be at the lower
bound of an interval of investments in the support of the mixed strategy. By Lemma 3,
this implies that only investments of 0 or k¯ can be chosen with strictly positive proba-
bility.
A corollary of the above results it that as long as the other firm invests below k¯ with
strictly positive probability, a firm has a positive reservation utility, from not providing
any investment at all. The reservation utility is equal to the utility from the share of
captive consumers multiplied by the probability that the competitor chooses an invest-
ment below k¯: o1(0) = Prob(k2 < k¯)α1 for firm 1 and o2(0) = Prob(k1 < k¯)α2 for firm
2. This implies that firms do not choose investments up to the level at which they just
break even. Instead at the maximum investment, the expected profit conditional on
this investment is equal to the reservation utility in form of the expected profit from
not investing at all.
3 Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of the game for different levels of the threshold
k¯. Let us assume without loss of generality that firm 1 enjoys a larger captive segment
than firm 2, α1 > α2. We are looking for closed-form equilibrium solutions and focus
on the linear cost function c(ki) = cki.
We consider three distinct cases. First, the threshold k¯ that conditions the effec-
tiveness of a firm’s investment with respect to captive consumers may be very low.
In this case, competition is intense and the market outcome is a monopoly with high
probability (Proposition 1). Second, for intermediate levels of k¯, firm 1, enjoying a
larger captive segment, only engages in competition for the contested segment. Firm
2, however, gambles for a monopoly position by choosing investments of k¯ with strictly
positive probability (Proposition 2). Third, if k¯ is very high, it is prohibitively costly for
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either firm to attract the competitor’s captive consumers. Thus, both firms only choose
investments below k¯ and compete for the contested segment only (Proposition 3). We
now turn to the analysis of these separate cases.




it is relatively easy to enter the consideration set of consumers in the competitor’s
captive segment. Moreover, both firms are in principle willing to choose investments
high enough to do so. We show that in equilibrium both firms randomize over two
disconnected intervals, one below and one above the threshold k¯. In this equilibrium,
firm 1 chooses to invest nothing with strictly positive probability because its larger
share of captive consumers makes it compete less aggressively.




= k¯l there exists a unique equilibrium in which both firms














(1−α1−α2+α21) if k ∈ [0, δ]
c(1−α2)k¯
1−α1−α2+α21 if δ < k ≤ k¯
ck + c(1−α1)α1k¯
1−α1−α2+α21 if k¯ < k ≤ K




1−α1−α2 if k ∈ (0, δ]
c(1−α1)k¯
1−α1−α2+α21 if δ < k < k¯
ck + c(1−α1)α1k¯
1−α1−α2+α21 if k¯ ≤ k ≤ K
1 if k > K
The cumulative distribution functions that characterize this equilibrium are such
that, (i) at any interior point of both interval, both firms investment strategies have the
same density and (ii) both firms investment strategies exhibit higher density on a given
investment in the lower interval than in the upper interval. Moreover, firm 2 invests
exactly k¯ with strictly positive probability, while firm 1 invests exactly 0 with strictly
positive probability. We represent the equilibrium strategies in Figure 1 and derive the
following results with respect to profit and market leadership.
Corollary 1. In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1, firm 2 invests more in expec-
tation and becomes a market leader with higher probability than firm 1. Both firms make an
expected profit of Π = F2(δ)α1 = F1(δ)α2 > 0.
For low values of the threshold k¯, firms have an incentive to sometimes invest ag-












Figure 1: Proposition 1: Cumulative distribution functions if k¯ < 1
c
1−α1−α2+α21




1−α1−α2+α21 . Dashed: firm 1, Gray solid: firm 2.
contested segment as well as the competitor’s captive segment in case of winning.
Competition is however never perfect and both firms always make a strictly positive
profit in equilibrium. This results from the fact that they can rely on the competitor
being less aggressive with positive probability. In such a case the captive consumers
remain unaware of the competitor’s offer and thus buy from the unique firm in their
consideration set, even if this firm did not invest in its quality.
Both firms’ strategies are symmetric, except for the level of investments that they
play with strictly positive probability. For each strictly positive investment below the
threshold beyond which captive consumers come into play, it must hold that




This is, by overbidding at a marginal cost c, a firm increases its probability of winning
the share α12 of indifferent consumers by cα12 , so that the marginal benefit of overbid-
ding is also equal to c and the firm is indifferent between all levels of investment in the
support. In the range of investments that attract also captive consumers, it must hold
that
f1(k) = f2(k) = c.(2)
This is because, for investments above k¯, having the highest investment is rewarded by
serving the entire market of size 1, including all captive consumers and the contested
segment. The marginal benefit of overbidding must therefore equal the cost c. The
preceding arguments imply that the slopes of the cumulative distribution functions Fi
are steeper below k¯ than above k¯ for both firms i = 1, 2.
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A consequence of these equilibrium investment strategies is that firm 2, having
the smallest segment of captive consumers, invests more aggressively and becomes a
market leader more often in expectation. This is not simply a curiosity deriving from
the mixed strategy equilibrium but results from the larger captive segment making
firm 1 more complacent. We find qualitatively similar results in an environment where
investments have probabilistic returns in terms of market size and the equilibrium is
in pure strategies (see Appendix B for details).
For the parameter values corresponding to Proposition 1, both firms make the same
expected profit, even if firm 1 appears to be the favored one due to its larger captive
segment. To understand the logic, it is helpful to consider the problem of firm 1: to
maximize its profit, it must be the case that no “obvious” overbidding strategy is avail-
able to firm 2. Hence, firm 1 wants to make firm 2 indifferent between all options in
the support of the mixed strategy investment. In order to do so, firm 2 must believe
that there is a sufficiently high probability P ′ that firm 1 invest some amount below k¯.
Similarly, firm 2 wants firm 1 to be indifferent between all options in the support of the
mixed strategy investment. For firm 1 to be indifferent between investments above and
below k¯, it must believe that firm 2 invests some amount below k¯ with a sufficiently
high probability P ′′. However, as α1 > α2 and expected profits are determined by the
outside options of both firms, E[Π1] = o1(0) = α1P ′′ = α2P ′ = o2(0) = E[Π2], it must
hold that P ′′ < P ′. Thus, the mixed strategy of firm 1 must be less aggressive than that
of firm 2 in order to make firm 2 indifferent between low and high investments. Firm
1 is thus trapped into less aggressive behavior by firm 2’s small captive segment.
At equilibrium, by definition, both firm 1 and firm 2 are indifferent between all
investment levels in the support of the mixed strategy. Moreover, even if one of the
two firms could commit ex-ante to a mixed strategy (using a randomization device),
the one that would maximize each firm’s expected surplus is the equilibrium one.
This result implies that the larger (dominant) firm is less likely to invest sufficient
amounts into quality to enter all consumers’ consideration sets. Instead, it counts on
its large captive segment remaining unaware of the competitor and abstains from com-
petition for the competitor’s small captive segment.
Consider second the case, where the threshold is sufficiently high for firm 1 not to
find it worthwhile to attract the consideration of firm 2’s captive share but firm 2 may
still want to attract firm 1’s captive segment. This asymmetry arises because firm 1 is
more content with its larger captive segment, and 2 is more eager to escape its initially
inferior market position.
Proposition 2. If k¯l < k¯ < α12+α1c = k¯h, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both firms




The cumulative distribution functions are given by
F1(k) =





k if k ∈ (0, δ]
c
α12
k if δ ≤ k ≤ k¯
1 if k ≥ k¯
The distribution functions are such that, at any point of the interval, both firms in-
vest with the same density. Moreover, Firm 2 invests exactly k¯ with strictly positive
probability, while Firm 1 invests exactly 0 with strictly positive probability. We imme-
diately obtain the following corollary regarding market outcomes.
Corollary 2. In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 2, firm 2 invests more in expecta-
tion than firm 1 and becomes a market leader more often. The expected profit of firm 2 is 1− ck¯
and the expected profit of firm 1 is α1 > 1− ck¯.
The result from Proposition 2 is similar to that from Proposition 1 but here it is too
costly for firm 1 to attract the captive segment of firm 2. Thus, firm 1 does not choose
investments equal to or above k¯ at all. As in the preceding arguments for investments
below k¯, it is still the case that both density functions satisfy




At or above k¯, only firm 2 invests. As it does not face competition at or above k¯,
firm 2 chooses an investment exactly equal to k¯ with strictly positive probability and
does never choose any strictly higher investment. This level is sufficient not only to
outbid firm 1 but to also attract firm 1’s captive segment with certainty. Firm 1 in
contrast decides not to invest at all with a strictly positive probability and otherwise
randomizes over relatively low investment levels.
Corollary 2 shows that, in this equilibrium, expected profits of both firms differ.
Firm 1 benefits from its larger base, invests less and makes a higher expected profit
than firm 2. The asymmetry in this equilibrium is twofold: firm 2 invests more aggres-
sively and wins the market more often, but firm 1 actually makes the highest profit in
expectation.
We now turn to the third case, where k¯ is so high that neither firm finds it profitable
to compete for the consideration of its competitor’s captive segment. Thus, both firms
refrain from full competition. The winner of this softened competition enjoys a domi-
nant market position but never achieves a monopoly. Even though the two firms have
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differently sized captive segments, they behave identically and end up dominating the
market with equal probability.
Proposition 3. If k¯ > k¯h, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both firms randomize
uniformly over a single interval [0, α12
c
].
The cumulative distribution functions are given by:
Fi(k) =
 cα12k for all k ∈ [0, α12c ]1 for k ≥ α12
c
for i = 1, 2
The distribution functions are such that, at any point, both firms invest with the
same density. No firm invest at any point with strictly positive probability. No firm
ever chooses an investment that would attract the consideration of the competitor’s
captive segment. Therefore, expected payoffs must equal the firms’ outside options
and market leadership is reached with equal probability.
Corollary 3. In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 3, both firms invest the same
amount in expectation and become a market leader with equal probability. The expected profit
of firm 2 is α2 and the expected profit of firm 1 is α1 > α2.
While it is obvious that competition for the entire population is not profitable for
k¯ > kmax = 1
c
, it is the case that k¯h < kmax. A priori, high investments can be profitable
for k¯h < k¯ < kmax if the success probability is high enough. However, in equilibrium
this is not the case so that neither firm chooses investments equal to or above k¯. As a
consequence, limε→0 F (k¯ − ε) = 1 and captive consumers do not consider the competi-
tor’s offer.
Having characterized these three equilibria, we now establish that this characteri-
zation is complete.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium of the investment game is unique and is characterized by
Proposition 1, 2 or 3 for low, intermediate, and high levels of k¯, respectively.
The uniqueness result closely relates to the equilibrium properties outlined in Lem-
mas 1 to 4. An equilibrium can either be a mixed strategy over two intervals or over
a single connected interval. Proposition 1 characterizes an equilibrium over two inter-
vals. Propositions 2 and 3 characterize two candidate equilibria over a single interval.
The formal proof shows that for neither of the three cases, an alternative equilibrium
exists. As the existence condition the three existing equilibria are mutually exclusive,
the equilibrium is indeed unique. This equilibrium is “stable” in the sense that best
responses to any small perturbation to the equilibrium probabilities would bring the
game back to equilibrium.7
7Consider a level of investment k′ < k¯ that is chosen by both firms with density f(k′) = cα12 in
equilibrium. Suppose firm 1 instead chose to put slightly more density at k′, say f(k′) = φ > cα12 .
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4 Implications
In this section, we discuss the major policy implications of our equilibrium results,
mostly focusing on the case where both firms are in the position of competing for the
whole market, described in Proposition 1. First, we show that the size of the contested
segment, α12 has a non-trivial effect on competition. Second, the size of the dominant
firm’s captive segment α1 has a non-monotonic effect on both firms’ levels of invest-
ment. Third, we study the effect of changing the difficulty of reaching the competitor’s
captive consumers’ consideration sets captured by our threshold k¯.
4.1 The share of consumers initially observing both firms has an am-
biguous impact on investment
The marginal effect of increasing the share of ex-ante indifferent consumers on ex-
pected investments is ambiguous and depends on the conjunction of three effects, that
we illustrate in Figure 2 for parameter values corresponding to Proposition 1. The ag-
gregate effect of α12 on expected investments is shown in the panel on the left-hand
side (Figure 2a). The expected investment of the firm with the smallest captive seg-
ment, firm 2, initially decreases with α12, and only reaches its initial level when the
share of the contested segment approaches 1. For the firm with the larger captive seg-
ment, firm 1, the effect of an increase in the contested segment is also negative in the
beginning but becomes positive as α12 surpasses 12 .
We plot the influence of the share of the contested segment α12 on three crucial
aspects of the firms’ investment strategies on the right-hand side (Figure 2b). First, δ,
the upper bound of the lower part of the investment strategies’ support, monotonically
increases to k¯ as the share of the contested segment goes to 1. This effect is driven by
the fact that investing at or above k¯ becomes increasingly irrelevant to a firm as the
captive segment of the competitor vanishes.
Second, α12 has the opposite effect on the probability that firm 2 chooses the highest
investment level. The probability P (k2 = k¯) of firm 2 investing exactly k¯ decreases as
α12 increases because its investments are spread over a larger interval with a higher
δ. When investments are more spread out, less probability mass can be allocated to
k¯. As P (k2 = k¯) = P (k1 = 0), this implies that the probability of firm 1 not investing
at all also decreases. Consequently, an increase in the share of contested consumers
makes the firm with a smaller (larger) captive segment invest less (more) aggressively.
Then, firm 2 would want to put more weight on the investment level marginally above k′, as marginally
outbidding an investment of k′ would yield an expected benefit of φα12 > c. This change in firm 2’s
investment strategy, however, would induce a strict decrease in the expected profit of firm 1. Thus, firm



















δP (k2 = k¯)
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k¯ = 5
(b) Elements of equilibrium bidding strategies.
Figure 2: Comparative statics with respect to the share of ex-ante indifferent consumers
α12 within the equilibrium of Proposition 1. Illustration with c = 0.1, k¯ = 5 and α1 =
3α2.
This results is driven by the fact that the absolute level of asymmetry between the two
firms’ captive segments shrinks as the contested segment becomes larger.
Third, the maximum bid K¯ initially decreases with α12 because the presence of more
contested consumers reduces the additional expected profit from investing at or above
k¯. It then increases when competition for the growing contested segment becomes
fiercer.
4.2 The share of captive consumers of the dominant firm has a non-
monotonic effect on both firms’ investments
While the above discussion is useful to disentangle the different effects, it does not
provide a tractable result, as further assumptions are needed on how the different sub-
groups of captive consumers evolve if the contested segment increases. In this section,
we focus on the perhaps most policy-relevant question of a dominant firm using its
market power to increase the share of its own captive consumers, who initially observe
only this firm’s product but are unaware of the competitor.
We make the assumption that the smallest firm has no captive consumers (α2 =
0) and study the impact of an increase in α1. We further assume the threshold k¯ is
sufficiently small for the equilibrium to be characterized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 5. The share of captive consumers of firm 1 has a non-monotonic effect on both
firms’ investment.An increase in α1 has a negative effect for α1 small and a positive effect for
α1 large.
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When the share of firm 1’s captive consumers, who initially consider only the prod-
uct of the dominant firm 1, increases, this has two effects. First, we observe an anti-
competitive effect because the dominant firm 1 invests less as α1 increases. The reason
is that firm 1’s outside option increase, that is its payoff when not investing at all.
As investments are strategic complements, firm 2 also invests less. Second, there is a
pro-competitive effect because an increasing share of captive consumers implies that
an increasing share of the market can be reached only by investing above the thresh-
old. Thus, these high investments become more profitable for the underdog firm 2 as
α1 increases, and due to complementarity both firms choose these investments more
often.
The first effect dominates when few consumers are captive to firm 1, whereas the
second effect dominates when already most consumers are captive to firm 1. As long
as we stay in the realm of Proposition 1 where both firms are in position to compete,
when the dominant firm becomes too dominant, it leaves no other option to the other
firm but to compete very aggressively for the entire market. Again, investments are
strategic complements so that this results in both firms investing more. When the
dominant firm 1 is not too dominant, however, a higher share of captive consumers
makes competition softer by segmenting the market.
4.3 Comparing the different equilibria
We now relax the assumption that the threshold k¯ is low enough for the equilibrium in
proposition 1 to hold and that α2 = 0, and compare the three possible equilibria. We
illustrate the effect of k¯ on expected investments in Figure 3. The vertical dotted lines
represent the values of k¯ that delimit the zones corresponding to Propositions 1 to 3.
When the investment threshold k¯ is small but strictly positive (part (i) of Figure
3, Proposition 1) both firms compete for the captive segment of their competitor with
positive probability but not with certainty. Whenever both firms choose investments
below k¯, competition is softened because it is restricted to the contested segment. Both
firms can then serve their captive segments even at an investment of zero. As a con-
sequence, both firms include zero investment in their investment strategy and make
strictly positive profits in expectation. Competition is dampened if k¯ increases and
firm 1 puts increasingly more mass on not investing at all. As a result, both E(k1) and
E(k2) decrease with k¯, and the gap between the two increases with k¯. Thus, while part
(i) applies, both firms invest less in quality as it gets harder to enter the consideration
set of the competitor’s captive consumers.
In part (ii) of Figure 3 (Proposition 2), the impact of k¯ on expected investments is
ambiguous. For these intermediate values, firm 1 that has the highest initial captive




















Figure 3: Expected equilibrium investment in the equilibria corresponding to Propo-
sitions 1 in part (i), 2 in (ii), and 3 in (iii). Illustration with α1 = 0.4, α2 = 0.1 and
c = 0.1.
for these values, and as opposed to Proposition 1, the probability mass allocated to
boundary points, P (k1 = 0) = P (k2 = k¯), decreases with the threshold k¯. This implies
that the investment strategies of firms become more and more symmetric, whereas
the profits become more and more asymmetric as the profit effect of the asymmetric
captive segments kicks in.
When k¯ reaches the level at which firms decide to only compete for ex-ante indif-
ferent consumers (part (iii) of Figure 3, Proposition 3), the expected investments in
both types of equilibrium are the same and the expected level of investment remains
constant for further increases in k¯. Firms compete only for the contested segment of
consumers who anyway consider both firms. Therefore, investment behavior is inde-
pendent of k¯.
5 Conclusion
When two players bid to win a discrete prize and both winning and losing bids are
forfeited, it is well known that in equilibrium players randomize continuously over a
connected interval of bids and make zero profit in expectation. In this paper, we an-
alyze a game between two firms that resembles this classic all-pay auction but differs
in the following way. We assume that each of the two competing firms may serve a
segment of captive consumers who can only be served by the competitor if it invests
above a certain threshold. If the investment falls short of this threshold, captive con-
sumers do not consider the product of the competing firm. We find that the existence
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of these captive segments induces asymmetries in the probabilities of one or the other
firm dominating the market. The reason is that the outside option of serving only its
own captive segment in a shared market is less attractive for a firm with a small captive
segment than it is for the competitor with a larger one.
The effect of the share of captive consumers on total expected investments is non-
monotone: if the underdog has sufficient resources to target the whole market, a higher
share of captive consumers of the dominant firm may lead to higher investments. This
may well have been the case for Internet Explorer competing with Google Chrome.
When Microsoft chose to breach its 2009 promise to make Windows users aware of the
existence of competing browsers to Internet Explorer, Google was already big enough
to compete aggressively, and eventually overtook most of the market before regulators
forced Microsoft to place Google Chrome such that it would enter the consideration
set of Windows users. Hence, a key question for a regulator is to identify whether
a competitor with the potential to overtake the whole market exists. Facing a weak
underdog, a regulator may do well to prevent the dominant firm from keeping con-
sumers unaware of alternatives to its products. Facing a strong underdog, the case is
much more balanced.
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is pure strategy equilibrium in
which firms 1 and 2 choose investments k1, k2 < kmax with certainty. Suppose first that
k1 = k2. Obviously, each firm could profitably deviate to marginally overbidding the
other as this would only marginally increase cost but discretely increases the chance of
winning. Thus, this cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose instead k1 < k2. We distinguish
two cases. If k2 ≥ k¯, firm 1 can profitably deviate to investing just marginally above k2
which would imply winning the entire market with certainty and by k2 < kmax would
yield a positive profit. Now consider the case k2 < k¯. This can only be an equilibrium
if firm 1 chooses k1 = 0 because it looses in any case. But then, firm 2 would want
to just marginally overbid 0 which could in turn be profitably outbid by firm 1. Thus,
these investments do not constitute an equilibrium either. The analogous arguments
hold if we exchange subscripts 1 and 2. Therefore, the equilibrium must be in mixed
strategies.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose firm 1 invests according to an equilib-
rium investment strategy F1 and as part of it chooses k1 = k′ with strictly positive
probability, P1(k′) > 0. Suppose further that also firm 2 chooses k′ with positive prob-
ability, i.e., P2(k′) > 0 is part of firm 2’s equilibrium strategy F2. Denote by E[Π2] the
expected profit of firm 2 given this strategy. Note that firm 2 can discretely increase
its expected profit by switching to a mixed strategy F ′2 that differs from F2 only in that
firm 2 reallocates probability mass from k′ to an investment of k2 = k′ +  for any
 > 0 small enough. Thus, both firms will not allocate positive probability to the same
investment.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. (i) We first show that, if there is a gap in the support of the mixed strategy
of a firm, the gap must be an interval containing k¯. Suppose there is a gap
[k′, k′′] in the support of firm i′s strategy between with k′, k′′ ∈ (0, k¯), k′ < k′′,
and Fi(k′) = Fi(k′′). Note that firm j then strictly prefers investing k′ over in-
vesting k′′ because the expected profit is the same but the expected cost is lower
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for the lower investment. Thus, firm j prefers to marginally overbid firm i at
k′ over any higher investment and in particular over investing k′′. This in turn
implies that firm i also strictly prefers to invest marginally above firm j’s invest-
ment over investing k′′ because k′′ is more expensive but does not increase the
chance of winning. Thus, the condition that a firms has the same expected profit
over the support of her mixed strategy would be violated. The same reasoning
applies to any pair k′, k′′ > k¯. Thus, if there is a gap, it must be the case that k′ < k¯
and k′′ ≥ k¯.
(ii) It follows that any gap must have as an upper bound k¯. Else, following the same
logic as above, a firm would strictly prefer bidding k¯ over some k′′ > k¯. Hence, if
there is a gap, it must be in some interval [δ, k¯].
(iii) The fact that firms randomize over the same intervals is a standard property: if an
investment k is part of only one firm’s mixed strategy support, this firm would be
better off investing less (at the top of the other firm’s support). The fact that the
bottom of the lower investment support is zero is also standard: else investing
zero with strictly positive probability would be a profitable deviation.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. For a mass point to be an equilibrium strategy, it must satisfy two properties.
First, by Lemma 2, a firm does not invest k with strictly positive probability in equi-
librium if k is in the support of the other firm’s strategy. Else, the other firm would be
better off marginally outbidding k than bidding just below it. Second, the same holds
if a value marginally below k is in the support of the other firm, for a similar reason.
There needs to be a gap in the support of the mixed strategy of player i below an in-
vestment k for firm i to invest k with strictly positive probability in any equilibrium.
This leaves only two possibilities: k = 0 (as no one invests below 0) and k = k¯ (if there
is a gap in the support of the investment strategy of the other firm below k¯).
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We first construct the equilibrium, then verify that indeed neither firm has an
incentive to deviate from the proposed investment strategy, and finally show that no
other equilibrium exists.
Characterization: For every investment of firm 2 below k¯ which is contained in the
support of the equilibrium strategy, the following condition has to hold (with  arbi-
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trarily small):
(4) F2(k)α12 + lim
ε→0
F2(k¯ − ε)α1 − ck = lim
ε→0
F2(k¯ − ε)α1 ⇒ F2(k) = c
α12
k
and for every investment equal to or above k¯
(5) F2(k)− ck = lim
ε→0
F2(k¯ − ε)α1 ⇒ F2(k) = ck + lim
ε→0
F2(k¯ − ε)α1
If firm 1 chooses zero with positive probability, firm 2’s mixed strategy must not
contain an atom at zero. However, firm 2 must also be indifferent between all invest-
ment levels in the support of its equilibrium mixed strategy. Denote firm 2’s expected
profit by E[Π2]. Then, for all k < k¯
F1(k)α12 + lim
ε→0
F1(k¯ − ε)α2 − ck = E[Π2]
⇒ F1(k) = c
α12
k +
E[Π2]− limε→0 F1(k¯ − ε)α2
α12
(6)
For every investment at k¯ or above having a lower investment than the competitor
implies also losing their share of captive consumers.
(7) F1(k)− ck = E[Π2] ⇒ F1(k) = ck + E[Π2]
From lines (4) to (7) it follows that firm 1’s and firm 2’s distribution functions have
the same slopes. This is true in both the low and the high investment range. Since
the slope is higher for investments below k¯ than for investments above k¯, there exists
δ ∈ (0, k¯) such that for both firms
(8) F1(k) = F1(δ) and F2(k) = F2(δ) for all k ∈ [δ, k¯)
and therefore limε→0 F1(k¯ − ε) = F1(δ) and limε→0 F2(k¯ − ε) = F2(δ).
Neither firm has an incentive to strictly exceed the maximum investment of the
other. This would increase the cost but not the probability of winning. Thus, there
exists a unique K such that F1(K) = F2(K) = 1 and for all ε > 0, F1(K − ε) < 1 and
F2(K − ε) < 1. Since the distribution functions of firms 1 and 2 also have identical
slopes for k ≥ k¯, the distribution functions of both firms are identical for k ≥ k¯:
(9) F1(k) = F2(k) for all k ≥ k¯
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Combining Equations (5), (7), and (9) yields E[Π2] = F2(δ)α1. Starting with Line (6)

















We plug in from line (4) and solve for F1(δ) to obtain









The flat part in the distribution functions (equation (8)) implies together with the
different shares of captive consumers that firm 2 chooses an investment equal to k¯ with
a positive probability while firm 1’s strategy has an atom at zero. Since the two firms
cannot have an atom at the same investment level (Lemma 2), and since neither firm
chooses δ with positive probability in equilibrium (Lemma 4), the distribution function
of firm 1 must be continuous in δ and k¯. In addition, at k¯ the distribution functions of
both firms take identical values. Thus, the following holds
(12) F1(δ) = F1(k¯) = F2(k¯)
We can rewrite (5) using (4) as




Taking line (12) and plugging in from line (11) on the left-hand side and from line













⇔ δ = k¯ α12(α12 + α2)




It is easily verified that
(1− α1)α12 < α12 + α21 ⇒ δ < k¯.
Finally, we derive the maximum investment levels. Suppose K > k¯. Since the dis-
tribution functions stay constant at one for all investment levels above the maximum
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level chosen, we obtain the following condition
(15) cK + F2(δ)α1 = 1⇔ cK = 1− α1c
α12
δ = 1− α1ck¯ (1− α1)α12
α12(α12 + α21)





− α1k¯ 1− α1
α12 + α21
.
As by assumption α1 + α2 + α12 = 1, we replace in the above results to state Propo-
sition 1.





− α1k¯ 1− α1
α12 + α21






Equilibrium verification: The above computations establish that both firms are in-
different between all levels of investment in their support such that it does not pay to
reshuffle probability mass within interior investments. Hence, it suffices to show that
there is no strictly profitable deviation for either firm to investments outside the sup-
port or at the boundaries. Note that by construction no firm has an incentive to deviate
to an investment in the gap or above K¯, as this would yield strictly lower expected
profit. Note further that firm 1 would be strictly worse off to invest k¯ with strictly pos-
itive probability than what she already gets by investing marginally above k¯ (as firm 2
invests exactly k¯ with strictly positive probability). The same holds for firm 2 investing
exactly 0, as it would get strictly lower profit then by investing just above 0.
Uniqueness: By the above construction, the slopes of the distributions over the two
intervals and the value of δ are the only ones satisfying the condition of equal profit
over the intervals. We also know from Lemmas 2 and 4 that the only other possibility in
terms of a mass point satisfying the condition that both firms need to invest with total
probability of 1 would be to have firm 1 investing k¯ with strictly positive probability
and firm 2 investing 0 with strictly positive probability. However, in any equilibrium
over two intervals, with K¯ the upper bound of the upper interval, it must hold by
Lemma 3 that F1(K¯) = F2(K¯) = 1, the profit of both firms must be identical. This
does not hold if α1 > α2, F2(0) > 0 and F1(0) = 0. Hence, Proposition characterizes
the unique equilibrium in which firms randomize over two disconnected intervals.
Furthermore, the indifference conditions prohibit any equilibrium with a connected
equilibrium support for low k¯. Thus, the equilibrium is unique.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Using the distribution functions from Proposition 1, we observe that F1(δ) >
F2(δ) so that firm 2 has a higher investment than firm 1 more often than the reverse.














































It is easily verified that E[k1] < E[k2]. By the properties of the mixed strategy equi-
librium, the expected profit of each firm i = 1, 2 equals its expected profit conditional
on investing zero. This corresponds to its outside option oi(0) which is the value of
its captive segment multiplied with the probability of the competitor investing below
k¯.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first construct the equilibrium and then verify that indeed neither firm has
an incentive to deviate from the proposed investment strategy, and finally show that
no other equilibrium exists.
Characterization: Suppose that both firms randomize over (0, δ) for some δ ∈ (0, k¯).
Suppose further that firm 1 chooses zero with positive probability and firm 2 chooses
k¯ with positive probability. Finally, suppose that firm 1 chooses investments below or
equal to δ with certainty (we verify this later), i.e., F1(δ) whereas firm 2 also chooses k¯
such that F2(δ) < 1. We now derive the value for δ ∈ (0, k¯).
As firm 1 invests only below k¯, firm 2 could ensure profit 1− ck¯ by investing k¯ with
certainty. Thus, the distribution function of firm 1 must fulfill for all k ≤ δ
(17) F1(k)α12 + α2 − ck = 1− ck¯ ⇒ F1(k) = c
α12
k +
1− α2 − ck¯
α12




> 0. Note that choosing k¯ also yields an
expected profit equal to 1− ck¯ for firm 2.
Firm 1 obtains an expected profit equal to its outside option o1(0) which is given
by its captive segment multiplied by the probability that firm 2 invests less than k¯,
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F2(δ)α1. For the distribution function of firm 2 and investments k ≤ δ the following
must hold:
F2(k)α12 + F2(δ)α1 − ck = F2(δ)α1 ⇔ F2(k) = c
α12
k






1− α2 − ck¯
α12
= 1⇔ δ = k¯ − α1
c
If k¯ < 1−α2
c
, then δ < α12
c
.
Finally, we derive the probability with which firm 2 chooses k¯.
Prob(k2 = k¯) = 1− c
α12










From line (17) also





k¯ = Prob(k2 = k¯)
By k¯ < 1−α2
c
, it holds that Prob(k2 = k¯) > 0. Moreover,
α12 > 0⇒ α12 + α2 > α2 ⇒ (1− α1)2 > α2(1− α1)⇒ α12 + α21 > α1 − α1α2
⇒ α12 + α
2
1








1− α2 ⇒ k¯ >
α1
c
so that δ < k¯.
By k¯ > 1
c
α12+α21









k¯α1 > 1− ck¯ ⇔ F2(δ)α1 > 1− ck¯
Equilibrium verification: From the above derivations, both firms are indifferent be-
tween all levels of investment in the support of their equilibrium investment strategies
by construction. Hence, it suffices to show that there is no strictly profitable deviation
for either firm. Note that no firm has an incentive to deviate to an investment strictly
above k¯, as this would yield strictly lower expected profit. Firm 1 would be strictly
worse off to invest k¯ as it would get the same expected profit as firm 2, lower than
what it gets at equilibrium. Further, firm 2 cannot gain from investing exactly 0, as it
would then get strictly lower profit than by investing just above 0.
26
Uniqueness: By the above construction, the cumulative distribution functions and
the value of δ are the only ones satisfying the indifference condition for randomiza-
tion of investments over a single connected interval. We also know from Lemmas 2
4 that the only other possibility in terms of mass points satisfying the condition that
both firms need to invest with total probability of 1 would be to have firm 1 invest k¯
with strictly positive probability and firm 2 invest 0 with strictly positive probability.
However, for such a mixed strategy to be an equilibrium it must also be true that firm
1 is indifferent between investing just above 0 and exactly k¯,
α1 + F2(0) = 1− ck¯,
and that firm 2 weakly prefers to invest 0 over investing k¯,
F1(δ)α2 ≥ 1− ck¯.
As α1 > α2, F1(δ) < 1 and F2(0) > 0, this leads to a contradiction. Hence, the above
equilibrium is the unique one where both firms randomized over the same connected
interval, when the total probability mass allocated below δ (remember there is only one
possible slope for the distribution at equilibrium) is strictly below 1. Note further that
there cannot be an equilibrium where firms randomize over two disconnected intervals
as the one described in Proposition 1 is the only one that exists but the condition on k¯
is not fulfilled here. Thus, the equilibrium we characterized here is unique for the set
range of k¯.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Using the distribution functions from Proposition 2, we observe that F1(δ) >






















α1 + α12 − ck¯
α12
where obviously E[k1] < E[k2].
By the properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected profit of each firm
i = 1, 2 equals its expected profit conditional on investing zero which is its outside
option oi(0) which is given by its captive segment multiplied with the probability of
the competitor investing below k¯.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let k¯ > 1−α2
c
. We first construct the equilibrium, verify that neither firm has an
incentive to deviate, and finally show that no other equilibrium exists.
Characterization: Suppose that neither firm chooses an investment high enough to
steal captive consumers from its competitor. The outside option of firm i = 1, 2 is to
keep its captive segment and receive a profit of oi(0) = αi. The prize of winning is
then the value of additionally attracting the contested segment α12. This observation
implies that both firms are symmetric at the margin. Moreover, the captive segments
can be disregarded since they are not at stake. Both firms compete until their expected
profits from competition are zero, in which case their expected profit is determined
only by their captive segment. Thus, in equilibrium, the following must hold for all
ki < k¯ for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i:
(19) Fj(ki)α12 − cki = 0⇔ Fj(ki) = c
α12
ki.
As the distribution function of investments cannot exceed 1, both firms random-
ize continuously over [0, α12
c
] and do not invest any higher amounts. The cumulative
distribution function is as follows for firm i = 1, 2:
Fi(k) =
 cα12k for all k ∈ [0, α12c ]1 for k ≥ α12
c
Each firm must be indifferent at equilibrium between all investments in [0, α12
c
], and
none of the two firms chooses zero with strictly positive probability because this would
not be consistent with the indifference condition in (19). The expected payoff of firm
1 and 2 is equal to its outside option, E[Π1] = o1(0) = α1 and E[Π2] = o2(0) = α2,
respectively.
Equilibrium verification: By the above, both firms are indifferent between all levels
of investment in their support by construction. Hence, it suffices to show that there
is no strictly profitable deviation for either firm. Suppose firm i considered deviating
to an investment at k¯, sufficient to capture the entire population. Then, firm i would
make an expected profit of F (α12
c
) − ck¯ = 1 − ck¯ < 1 − (1 − α2) = α2 < α1 such
that this deviation is not profitable for firm i = 1, 2. As a consequence, no investment
level at or above k¯ forms part of the equilibrium mixed strategy. We also know that
any investment between α12
c
and k¯ would yield strictly lower profit, hence there is no
profitable deviation.
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Uniqueness: We have shown above that the slopes of the distributions and the
value of δ as specified in the equilibrium characterization are the unique ones satisfy-
ing the condition of equal profit for randomization over a single connected interval.
Hence, the above equilibrium is the unique one on a single interval when the total
probability mass allocated below δ is equal to 1. Note further that there cannot be an
equilibrium where firms randomize over two disconnected intervals as the one de-
scribed in Proposition 1 is the only one that exists but the condition on k¯ is not fulfilled
here. According to Lemmas 1 to 4, no further equilibrium types are admissible. Thus,
the equilibrium we characterized here is unique for the set range of k¯.
Proof of Corollary 3













for i = 1, 2
per firm. In total, the two firms invest α12
c
. Since equilibrium mixed strategies and
investments are identical, both firms have the same probability of winning of 1
2
. The
expected profit of each firm equals its expected profit conditional on investing zero
which is the value of its captive segment.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Propositions 2 and 3 each characterized an equilibrium that is unique for the
range of k¯ to which the respective proposition applies. The proof is completed by
noting that the ranges of k¯ given in Propositions 1 to 3 constitute a partition of the
admissible range for k¯.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Using the investment levels found in Proposition 1, replacing α2 by 0 and α12 by 1−α1




k¯(α1(4 + α1ck¯)− ck¯ − 2)





k¯(α1(4− α1ck¯)− ck¯ − 2)
2((α1 − 1)α1 + 1)2 .
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k¯(2− ck¯) < 0,









= k¯ > 1.
B Probabilistic setting
In this section, we show that the fact that investment is deterministic with a discrete
threshold k¯ is not crucial to our results. Consider two firms, 1 and 2 choosing a level
of investment ei, with i ∈ {1, 2}, at cost c(ei) with c′ > 0, c′′ > 0 and c(0) = 0. Firms
compete for consumers from a population of mass one. This population consists of
three types of consumers, t1, t2, and tu. Types t1 and t2 occur with frequency α1 and α2,
respectively, in the population and the remaining part are of type tu, α12. The structure
of the game and frequencies of types are common knowledge.
Different from the main part of the text, we assume captive consumers of firm i
(types t1 and t2) bear a switching cost k¯ if they join the other firm. Hence, the utility
of a consumer visiting a firm i is equal to ei, minus the switching cost when it applies.
Consumers of type tu are ex ante undecided and do not experience switching costs.
Suppose all types of customers intend to join the firm that maximizes their utility
but may make mistakes and join the “wrong” firm. We employ the commonly used
ratio-form contest success function which imposes that the probability of choosing one
firm over the other equals its share in total investments.8
The ex-ante indifferent consumers choose firm i with a probability




The captive consumers of type ti choose the firm i with a probability
(21) piti(ei, ej) =
ei + k¯
ei + ej + k¯
.
8Jia (2008) shows how such a contest success function can be derived from a model where the real-
ized benefits from given investments are subject to stochastic shocks which are drawn independently
from an inverse exponential distribution.
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Therefore, the captive consumers of type tj choose firm i with a probability
(22) pitj(ei, ej) = 1− pii(ei, ej) =
ei
ei + ej + k¯
.
Firm 1 chooses the level of investment that maximizes her expected profit
(23) E(Π1) = α12p1tu(e1, e2) + α1p
1
t1









e2(α1 + α2) + α2k¯
(e1 + e2 + k¯)2
.





e1(α1 + α2) + α1k¯
(e1 + e2 + k¯)2
.
We immediately observe that:
(i) The equilibrium level of investment decreases in the cost-efficiency (the c func-
tion).
(ii) The firm that invests the most in equilibrium is the firm with the smallest captive
segment.
(iii) Assuming no firm has a majority of captive consumers, the largest firm is, in
expectation, the one with the smallest captive segment.
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